Coin Brief ENDE

How a dropped XCM credit cut dotUSD's recorded supply and let a Polkadot pool misprice it

A post on the Polkadot forum on 3 November walks through the code behind a dotUSD incident that Parity had described at a high level in an incident review the day before. The author, posting as Zealynx, read the fix in polkadot-sdk and the regression test the Polkadot Fellowship added, and explains both the accounting error and why a trading pool turned it into a price. The post states that everything it covers is already fixed and public.

The bug sat in the XCM executor, which runs cross-chain messages. Since a change merged in February 2026, the executor holds withdrawn assets as credits, objects that represent tokens taken out of an account. In the WithdrawAsset instruction, the variable collecting those credits was declared outside a transactional block that rolls back storage changes on error. If a later asset in the same instruction failed, the account debits were undone, but the credits went out of scope outside the rolled-back block. When a credit is dropped, the assets pallet reduces total supply and emits a BurnedCredit event, and because that happened outside the block it stuck. Repeating the instruction lowered recorded supply while no balance changed. The regression test shows the simplest case: an account holding 1,000 dotUSD and no DOT tries to withdraw both, the DOT part fails, and before the fix the balance came back but the supply did not. A fix merged on 25 June moved the variable inside the block.

The second half explains the price impact. The assets pallet caps the balance it reports as spendable at the asset's total supply, and the asset-conversion pool reads its reserves through that function. Once supply fell below the pool's real dotUSD holdings, the pool saw a smaller reserve than it had and paid too much DOT for dotUSD, which could be minted one-to-one against USDT. A Fellowship pull request counted 4,213,885 dotUSD in balances across 63 accounts against a recorded supply of 153,884; the correction required a multi-block migration delivered in runtime 2.5.2 through OpenGov.

The author also notes that the bug was rated medium in June, before dotUSD and its pool existed, and suggests other runtimes check for credits created inside a transactional block but owned outside it, and monitor any asset whose recorded supply drifts from the sum of its balances.

How a dropped XCM credit cut dotUSD's recorded supply and let a Polkadot pool misprice it
How a dropped XCM credit cut dotUSD's recorded supply and let a Polkadot pool misprice it — Coin Brief

What it means

The case shows how a bookkeeping error becomes a market risk once another component reads the number. Severity ratings for such bugs need revisiting when new products start depending on the affected value.

Written by Victoria Shinder.